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1. Introduction
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
These are two of the eight Millennium Development Goals that have been deﬁned by the United Nations in
2000. Organic contract farming has high potential for both of these goals and this is why this study is devoted
to a better understanding of its eﬀect. While it is clear now that Sub-Saharan Africa is oﬀ-track to meet
its targets for 2015 (UN, 2011), it seems relevant to focus on this part of the world. Indeed with 30 percent
of African population suﬀering from chronic hunger and a large population growth, any other continent is
as concerned by poverty as Africa. The organic contract farming used here as study case is located in the
western part of Uganda, in the Bundibugyo district. This region shares many common features with other
African countries. Therefore, a deep understanding of this case may be useful for eventual replication of
similar arrangement scheme.
For a better understanding of this study, I will explain why organic agriculture oﬀers interesting potential
for reducing poverty and why contract farming arrangement can be a successful tool for fulﬁlling this potential.
However, in order to fully evaluate the impacts of organic contract farming scheme, it is necessary to evaluate
the spillovers on the local community, including people that do not directly participate in such scheme. One
of these spillovers is the creation of employment opportunities and this is the focus of this study. An increase
in labor demand may limit conversion to organic farming in country where labor supply is scarce. However,
in a country like Uganda where rural poor are often underemployed and have no - or too little - land to
meet their own needs, job creation is a positive and crucial contribution for poverty alleviation. Hence, if
organic contract farming increases labor demand, this deserves to be emphasized. For now, existing literature
has never studied this speciﬁc consequence and thus, future research should rigorously quantify this eﬀect
on labor demand. My own study, though limited by data availability on farm labor input, is a ﬁrst step
in this important investigation. I will use a simple farm-household model in order to illustrate how farmers
determine their farm labor demand as well as their farm and oﬀ-farm labor supply. This model has really
modest purposes and aims only to give the main intuition about how the participation in an organic contract
farming scheme can modify these decisions. At last, the empirical analysis will provide support for the
main hypothesis that is tested: organic contract farming scheme increases the farm labor demand. Yet,
results suggest this does not come from more labor intensive organic farm practices but mainly comes from
higher price and product quality that are associated with the participation in this organic contract farming
arrangement.
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces potentials and challenges of organic agriculture
and contract farming. Section 3 focuses on Uganda and on potential employment contribution. Section 4
presents the cocoa and vanilla organic contract farming scheme with the exporter Esco (U) Ltd. Section 5
is dedicated to a simple farm-household model. At last section 6 and 7, focus on the empirical investigation
and its results.
2. Organic agriculture and contract farming. . .
In 2010, the global organic market represents US$ 59.1 billion while this was only US$ 17.9 billion in 2000
and was virtually zero at the beginning of the 1990s (Willer and Kilcher, 2012). Such market expansion is
undoubtedly signiﬁcant and has been mainly driven by North-American and European consumers. However,
their own organic production can not satisfy their demand in tropical products and in year-round temperate
products. As a result, certiﬁed organic import in these two regions has followed this growing trend and has
oﬀered signiﬁcant export opportunities for many producers in developing countries. Nowadays, 160 countries
all around the world are engaged in certiﬁed organic production (Willer and Kilcher, 2012). Besides, the
interest of organic agriculture goes far beyond the simple market potential and that is why it has attracted
a growing attention from activists and economists.
L'université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne n'entend donner aucune approbation, ni désapprobation aux
opinions émises dans ce mémoire ; elles doivent être considérées comme propre à leur auteur.
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Organic agriculture: Introduction to its potential beneﬁts
Multiple reports such as the one by Scialabba and Hattam (FAO, 2002), by Damiani (IFAD, 2002) on Latin
America or by Giovannuci (IFAD, 2005) on Asia have documented the appropriateness of organic agriculture
for small farming in developing countries. Markets oﬀer a price premium for this diﬀerentiate agricultural
production and organic products are part of the high value agricultural trade. In a world where terms of
trade rarely beneﬁt primary producers, this is a signiﬁcant economic beneﬁt for them (Parrot et al., 2006).
In fact this 'organic price premium', added with the fall in input cost (synthetic fertilizer, pesticides, etc),
is the main economic advantage for conventional producers1. Indeed, given the high market cost of these
inputs, this is not a negligible advantage for most of them. Yet, stopping the use of synthetic inputs may
also lead to a decline in yield and this is a potential issue. After conversion, usually yields considerably
decline in the ﬁrst year and then stabilize after the third year. This may stabilize at a higher, similar or lower
yields level (Giovannucci, 2005). However, in developed countries, they typically stabilize at a lower level2
and this trade-oﬀ between yield and input cost (added with other beneﬁts) has to be taken into account for
these countries before conversion. On the contrary, for developing countries, such declines in yield are far to
be the rule (Badgley et al. 2007) and for traditional agriculture1only an improvement in yield is possible.
Therefore, for traditional agriculture, little objection on this point can be done against conversion to organic
agriculture. In addition, organics agriculture is considered to improve soil fertility, limit erosion and better
withstand natural calamities such as droughts that are a major cause of food shortage. Empirical evidences
also document that organic practices improve pest and disease control. Furthermore, organic system often
requires crop diversity and therefore, added with the other beneﬁts, organic agriculture exhibits a strong
potential for improving food security (Giovannucci, 2005). Another advantage for producers is that, contrary
to conventional farming, it does not have negative impact on health, does not require intensive water use and
all necessary inputs can be domestically or locally supplied. As a result, all these elements of sustainability
make organic agriculture a valuable tool to reduce poverty, in particular where conventional farming would
be impractical, too costly or too damaging.
Challenges and solutions
Nevertheless, it will be unrealistic to assume there is no diﬃculty for traditional producers in order to catch
fully all these beneﬁts. While most of these advantages are intrinsic into the production system of organic
farming, the income beneﬁt, on the contrary, is dependent on many external factors such as market access
and certiﬁcation. Giovannucci (IFAD, 2005) has stressed that the most important factors for successful
organic adoption are likely to be the institutional support system, the access to technology and ﬁnance for
certiﬁcation as well as the marketing capability. However, in many developing countries, such as in Africa
for instance, there is no public assistance in order to help the conversion. Low domestic saving and diﬃcult
access to credit generally imply that farmers need ﬁnancial support. Therefore, from a ﬁnancial point of
view, organic certiﬁcation seems out of reach for most of them. In addition, organic conversion requires
technical advices, high quality management, skills for setting up an internal control system, etc. Product
commercialization also requires market information and a wide range of knowledge including marketing skills.
These are likely to be impossible to satisfy for smallholders (Giovannucci, 2005). Hence, even though organic
farming practices oﬀer signiﬁcant beneﬁt in terms of soil fertility, biodiversity, etc., the organic price premium
coming from the certiﬁcation does not appear to be a realistic expectation for most of producers in developing
countries without external support.
In order to make conversion possible, two common sources of support are available: from NGO or from
contractual arrangement with private company. NGO's support exhibits some valuable advantages such as
HIV/AIDS prevention or other services that are simultaneously oﬀered. However market aspect is a primary
1'Conventional agriculture' refers to agriculture using synthetic inputs such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides. 'Traditional
agriculture' represents agriculture that does not use - or only in negligible quantity - synthetic inputs. At last, 'Organic
agriculture' is deﬁned by IFOAM (2009) as a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems and people. It
relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local conditions rather than the use of inputs with adverse
eﬀects. Organic agriculture combines tradition, innovation and science (..). Therefore, both absence of synthetic inputs and
use of speciﬁc practices are within the concept of organic farming. Yet, these practices are not compulsory for being certiﬁed as
organic product.
2This is a well documented fact in the literature. For overview, see for instance Nieberg and Oﬀerman (2003) in Europe,
Dmitri and Greene (2006) for US.
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concern for farmers and unfortunately, development professionals are not often trained to help them to develop
a strong market orientation (Giovannucci, 1999). As a whole, their market seeking supply approach has
been evaluated less eﬃcient that the supply seeking market of private ﬁrms (Guijt and Woodhill, 2008).This
view is becoming increasingly recognized and this is why inviting private sector to provide marketing services
appear to be a particularly relevant approach (Giovannucci, 2005).
Contract farming: Pros and cons
A contractual arrangement with a private company is generally named as a contract farming arrangement3.
Particularly since the early 1990s, contract farming has attracted a lot of attention from researchers since this
is a widely adopted type of arrangement4 and its role is expected have a growing importance in developing
countries (Bellemare, 2010). Some researches speciﬁcally focus on developing countries and/or Africa5 and
this enable to identify what are the potential outcomes from such arrangement in these countries. Obviously,
private ﬁrm can have a crucial role for linking farmers to markets while ensuring to make business proﬁtable.
In the case of organic product, this implies that ﬁrm will provide a solution to all the main challenges that
prevent smallholders from being certiﬁed. Firm will ﬁnance the high cost of certiﬁcation, provide technical
assistance and training for organic farming, set an internal control system, ensure the commercialization of
products, etc. Say diﬀerently, ﬁrm may help to correct existing market failures (Grosh, 1994) and potentially
contribute to increase welfare. However, ﬁrm also directly beneﬁts of this form of arrangement through
economies of scale and reduction of private trader's transaction cost (Simmons, 2002, Warning and Key,
2002, Poulton et al. 2004). As a whole, organic contract farming has strong potential to be a win-win
strategy.
While individual rationality means that farmers engage in contract farming only if this increases their
welfare, and ﬁrm only if this is proﬁtable, empirical conclusions are not always so simple. Contract is written
by private ﬁrm but the ﬁrm's goal is to maximize its proﬁt. Such goal may be contrary to the interest of
farmers and since farmers are possibly not well organized, it may be diﬃcult for them to ensure fairness and
enforcement of contract (Giovannucci, 2005). If the contract and relationship are not well balanced, that is
to say this does not enable a mutual gain with a fair share of economic return, contract farming may simply
be a tool for labor exploitation by capitalists6. Besides, as farmers are engaged in a speciﬁc-relationship with
this scheme, their bargaining power may decline over-time and this may prevent them to rise their income
in the long run (Little and Watts, 1994, Havnevik et al., 2007). This is obviously a key point because if ﬁrm
captures all the return, the income beneﬁt associated with organic certiﬁcation will disappear for producers.
Another common critic is that contract farming increases rural inequality (Key and Runsten, 1999).
Indeed, ﬁrm sometimes targets more established farmers, those that have superior factor endowments or
greater experience of growing the crop (Gibbon et al., 2008). Yet, this argument is probably not strong enough
to make contract farming a bad kind of arrangement. Even though contract farming may improve the welfare
of better-oﬀ farmers while excluding the poorest of direct beneﬁts, these better-oﬀ farmers consume local
products, may create employment and as a whole stimulate local economy. Therefore, despite inequalities
may increase, this does not impact negatively the poorest and on the contrary, they beneﬁt from positive
spillovers.
As a whole, contract farming is not always a panacea for poverty alleviation and contract has to be
well-balanced in order to prevent exploitation of farmers. Yet, in my study case, this potential risk does not
realized and the organic contract farming scheme with Esco (U) Ltd. has been a win-win strategy. As shown
by the analysis of Gibbon and Jones (2011), the welfare impact of the scheme has been positive for members.
Their revenue is signiﬁcantly higher and since entry in the scheme has been possible for anyone living in
selected areas, there is no direct selection of better-oﬀ farmers from the ﬁrm. Nevertheless, not everybody
has joined: either because they were not living in selected parishes or because the cost was expected to be
3A classical deﬁnition of contract farming used in the literature is the one of Roy (1972) that deﬁnes it as a contractual
arrangements between farmers and other ﬁrms, whether oral or written, specifying one or more conditions of production and/or
marketing of an agricultural product. Obviously this is a very broad deﬁnition but the functioning of the Esco scheme will be
described later and will provide an illustration of this deﬁnition.
4See for instance the seminal articles of Roy (1963), Glover and Kustere (1990), Glover and Ghee (1992), Grosh (1994).
5See Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002, Simmons (2002), Röttger (2004), Gibbon and Ponte (2005), Bijman (2008), Minot (2009),
Bellemare (2010). Besides, Oya (2012) oﬀers a review of theoretical pros- and cons- of contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa.
6See Glover and Kusterer (1990), Clapp (1994), Watts (1994), Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997).
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higher than the beneﬁt. For instance, this may be the case for owners of the smallest farms that can think
that high requirements - mainly linked to organic certiﬁcation or quality - were too demanding for only a
very small production sold at Esco. As a result, in order to evaluate all impacts of the scheme, it is necessary
to also evaluate the spillovers on the local community, including people that were not member of the Esco
scheme. One of this spillover is the creation of employment opportunities and this is the focus of this study.
3. ...with a speciﬁc focus on Uganda and on potential employment
contribution
The previous section has enabled the reader to understand the general potential of organic farming and
contract farming arrangement. Yet, my contribution focuses on a very speciﬁc channel through which such
scheme can alleviate poverty: the labor demand. In order to understand better the interest of this study, I
will review the rather scarce literature on organic farming and position my own research within them. Then,
I will introduce some important features of Uganda and its western part in order to contextualize this study
case. Obviously diﬀerent regions of the world oﬀer similar features and that is why replication of similar
organic contract farming scheme can be conceivable if evaluation is positive. I will then explain why rural
labor opportunities are crucial for all poverty alleviation strategy. If organic contract farming contributes to
improve welfare through this channel, this is an important positive spillover that deserves to be emphasized.
Literature review
Since organic farming is a relatively recent topic, the total literature is limited and only a small number of
studies have been done on certiﬁed organic farming in developing country. These studies mainly focus on
Latin America and Asia. Lyngbaek et al. (2001) focus on case in Costa Rica, Bray et al. (2002) in Mexico,
Damiani (IFAD, 2002) in Latin America, Giovannucci (IFAD, 2005) in Asia, Tovar et al. (2005) in Mexico,
Bacon (2005) and Valkila (2009) in Nicaragua, Eyrhorn et al. (2007) in India, Oelofse et al. (2010) in China
and Brazil. Yet, recently some researchers have begun to investigate this phenomenon in Africa. This is
the case of Gibbon et al. (2008), Bolwig et al. (2009) and Gibbon and Jones (2011) that focus on organic
contract farming in Uganda, Bakewell-Stone et al (2008) in Tanzania, Guijt and Woodhill (2008) in East
Africa and Thamaga-Chitja et al. (2008) in South Africa. Except for the latter two, the studies in Africa are
based on organic contract farming schemes that have been supported by EPOPA7. Besides, most of studies
do not report comprehensive farm budget data and only three studies, Bacon (2005), Bolwig et al. (2009)
and Gibbon and Jones (2011), use econometric analysis. As a result, this is still an under-researched topic.
The three studies in Uganda report signiﬁcant positive income beneﬁt for scheme members. This comes
from organic price premium and up-grading of product quality. Besides Bolwig et al (2009) report that
organic practices increase yield while Gibbon et al. (2008) notice that food-security has improved but gender
inequality has increased. Indeed, women decrease their oﬀ-farm labor to increase their work load into the
farm. While farm income is typically controlled by men, women control their own oﬀ-farm income. Thus,
women lose signiﬁcant control over household expenditure when participating in the contract farming scheme.
Nevertheless, all women agree that gain associated with this participation largely worth this drawback. To
conclude, my research is in line with these three previous studies that aims to evaluate the eﬀect of organic
contract farming in Uganda. However, I investigate a new contribution of organic contract farming to poverty
alleviation: the eﬀect on labor demand.
Organic sector in Africa and Uganda
In Africa, there is slightly more than one million hectares of certiﬁed organic agricultural land. This represents
around 3 percent of the world organic agricultural land and 34 percent of all the organic producers (i.e. 540
000 producers) in 2010 (Willer and Kilcher, 2012). Therefore organic certiﬁcation is still marginal in Africa
7Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) is a programme created by the Swedish International Devel-
opment Cooperation Agency (Sida) in 1994. Exporters usually work with EPOPA in order to review all the important aspects
such as market demand, product quality price, farmer's interest, project organization and feasibility (Epopa, 1998). Besides,
I use the same data set that Gibbon and Jones (2011) on the Esco scheme that has been kindly provided by Peter Gibbon. I
sincerely thank Peter Gibbon and Sam Jones for their precious help.
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and this can easily be explained by all the challenges stressed in the second section. Yet, what is striking is the
spectacular rise of organic certiﬁcation this recent year. Indeed, ten years ago, certiﬁed organic agricultural
land was less than 60 000 ha, thus this corresponds almost to a 17 fold. Within this continent, Uganda has
the most certiﬁed organic land with 0.23 million ha (i.e. 1.64 percent of all agricultural land in Uganda) and
the most producers (188 625) (Willer and Kilcher, 2012). Since in 1999, only 7 000 farms were certiﬁed and
were using only 0.06 percent of agricultural land, these ﬁgures illustrate the clear growing trend.
Despite local market initiatives are spreading rapidly in Uganda (Rundgren and Lustig, 2007), domestic
market is still a very minor market and the great majority of certiﬁed organic product is destined for export
market. Uganda is one of the leading African organic exporters and its export value for organic product was
US$ 42 million in 2010-20118 (Willer and Kilcher, 2012). Smallholder contract farming is the main source
of export from Uganda and Africa as a whole (Gibbon and Jones, 2011). Besides, certiﬁed organic export
production in Uganda begun in 1994 with two export projects that have been the only ones until 1997, when
the company Kofti get approval for a cocoa project in Bundibugyo (Gibbon, 2006). Because of security
reason, the project only begun in 2002 under the ownership of Esco (U) Ltd. This is this scheme that I will
study here and which have also been study by Gibbon and Jones (2011). In 2005, 17 certiﬁed organic export
projects - plus 11 that were technically under in-conversion  were located in Uganda. Among them, one
targets cocoa crop and ﬁve target vanilla, these are the two crops of our Esco scheme.
Cocoa is a relatively minor export crop in Uganda and is entirely produced by smallholders, mostly in
the Bundibugyo district. In 2005, four companies were buying cocoa, and the only one being certiﬁed by
sustainability standard is Esco (U) Ltd. Despite its high volatility, global cocoa price has followed an upward
trend since 2000. This trend is mainly due to repeated global supply deﬁcit and long-term problem in Cote
d'Ivoire`s production that is historically the leader of this market. Besides, these recent years have revealed a
growing demand for high-quality product and sustainable production and this remains an area of expansion
for cocoa (Gibbon and Jones, 2011). Consumers of organic cocoa require high quality and therefore organic
cocoa has to satisfy some strict quality requirements. These high quality requirements are also essential for
the exporters. Indeed, the demand for organic cocoa is rather irregular and organic exporters must be able to
sell their product in the conventional market of high quality cocoa if needed. The price premium attached
to quality depends basically on the color, ﬂavor, size, absence of molds and appearance of beans. After
harvesting, pods have to be open within three to ﬁve days in order to extract beans. Then, full fermentation
of beans can take six or seven days and enables development of aroma and ﬂavor. After fermentation process,
the beans are washed and dried in the sun (ICCO, 2007)9.
Vanilla production in Uganda became really established in the late 1990s. Yet, prices of vanilla are very
volatile, especially during the last decade. They have known a heavy rise from 2000s to 2003, then a sharp
decline due to the re-entry of Madagascar into the market10.The organic certiﬁcation of vanilla crop gives
access to a luxury niche and was partly a response to this decline in global prices (Gibbon, 2006).
Ugandan context
In order to better contextualize the study, I will brieﬂy describe some important socioeconomic features of
Uganda. Most of these features give indication about why organic farming is adapted for a country like
Uganda.
Uganda is a small landlocked country of East Africa. Its population is estimated reach 35,873,253 inhab-
itants in July 2012 (CIA, 2012). The Bundibugyo district  the district in which is settled the Esco scheme 
is into the western region of the country. This district borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its soil
is volcanic and very fertile and the annual precipitation is about 2,150 mm while average temperature ranges
from 28 to 35 °C. According to the Uganda Population and Housing Census (Ubos, 2002), the agricultural
sector accounts for 73 percent of total employment for persons aged 10 years and above11. Agricultural sys-
8A few years ago, in 2005 (during the ﬁrst survey's round of my data), organic export was estimated at $7 million (Willer
and Kilcher, 2012).
9As stressed by Gibbon and Jones (2011), market taste and scientiﬁc research (Hii et al.,2009) indicate that high quality
beans required timely natural fermentation and drying by sun rather than this being delayed and then dried mechanically.
10At this time, Madagascar and Indonesia supplied almost all the global market. In 2000, Madagascar was hurt by cyclones
that destroyed almost all the vanilla crop. This had been followed by political crises and, therefore, this is only at the end of
2003, that Madagascar went back into the global market, causing a drastic fall in the vanilla price.
11Uganda is quite representative to Sub-Saharan African population as a whole. This is estimated that 80 per cent of African
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tem is still highly traditional and consumption level of synthetic fertilizer is extremely low - with 1.0 kg/ha in
2005 for instance (World Bank) - and has been stagnant, as in most African countries12. The reason of non
use is mainly: too expensive but also for the western region: Not available (Ubos, 2010). Besides, among
agricultural household, only 0.9 percent practice irrigation (Ubos, 2010). These are therefore arguments
toward organic agriculture. Indeed conventional agriculture often requires irrigation so as to make chemicals
input fully eﬃcient. In Uganda (and in most African countries), this is not a realistic solution for most of
agricultural household. On the contrary, organic farming does not require costly market-supplied inputs and
appear to be more easily feasible.
The prevalence of undernourishment in total Ugandan population was estimated to 22 per cent in the
period 2006-2008 (FAOSTAT). This level is deﬁned by FAO as moderately high, and is indeed relatively
moderate compare to other Eastern (or even Central) African countries. Among the Ugandan agricultural
households, 56.7 percent (Ubos, 2010) have reported that their members were not able to aﬀord eating
normally during the year. Among them, 91.5 percent experienced drought and 66 percent pest and disease
that have caused food shortage. Organic system enables to better withstand drought, that is to say that
falling in yield is signiﬁcantly lower while drought happens (Giovannucci, 2005). In addition, organic practices
have potential for improving pest and diseases controls (Giovannucci, 2005). There exists a wide range of
integrated pest management that includes provision of habitats for beneﬁcial organisms, crop rotation and
nutrient management for instance that may help agricultural household to prevent  or soften  these food
shortages.
If we have a look on the education level of agricultural households, we see that only 55.1 percent of male
and 44.9 percent of female members are able to read and write. We ﬁnd also that for the Bundibugyo district
(in line with national ﬁgure), 14 percent of households are headed by a member (male or female) that cannot
read and write13. As a result, this limits the possibility for becoming certiﬁed for these households. For
instance, in the Esco scheme, the Internal Control System - necessary for certiﬁcation - requires to keep the
record of all the cocoa purchased by Esco. This kind of requirement, very common for organic certiﬁcation,
is likely to act as a barrier to entry for this 14 percent of household (that are also likely to be the poorest).
Another comment is linked to the general low level of education in Uganda. One of the important lessons
we have drawn from the Asian experience is that investment in schooling is crucial so as to make possible
more remunerating oﬀ-farm activities  that are in fact the major driver for massive improvement in wealth.
This implies that, the ﬁrst step of the development process is to increase income of rural population in
order to enable investment in education (Estudillo and Otsuka, 2010). This ﬁrst step is critic and cannot
be skipped. While no-one argues that organic farming oﬀers the prospect for high economic growth and is
the ultimate solution to poverty, organic farming may valuably contribute to this initial step by rising the
income of certiﬁed farmers (and on the community through positive spillovers). Before ending this general
contextualization, information about demographic and land holding seem required.
The annual population growth rate in the Bundibugyo district was estimated at 4 percent14 (Ubos, 2002)
and the average household size is 6 (Ubos, 2010). While 93 percent of Agricultural households own their
land, the national average holding size is 1.1 ha at the national level and only 0.8 ha for the western region.
This basically means that population is quickly growing while average holding size is already small to provide
resource for a family. This trend may intuitively justify the focus on employment opportunities.
Rural labor market and beneﬁt from job opportunities
An important aspect of certiﬁed organic farming has for now been omitted. This is its impact on labor
demand. In fact, this impact has never been rigorously studied but this is generally accepted that organic
farming practices are more labor intensive. Compared to conventional agriculture (i.e using synthetic inputs),
IFAD's reports (Damiani, 2002 and Giovannucci, 2005) clearly state that organic practices increase labor
requirement. This is supported by Oelofse et al. (2010) that have studied medium-high input system prior to
depend on farming or related activities and that 30 percent suﬀer from chronic hunger and malnutrition (FAO conference, 2011).
12Synthetic fertilizer consumption level was as low as 12.3 kg/hectare for 2002-003 in Sub-Saharan while it was 106.6 kg for
South Asia and 89.5hg for Latin America. Besides, the consumption in 1980 was 14.2 kg/hectare. (Kelly et al., 2005).
13In fact Ubos (2010) informs that agricultural households in Bundibugyo District are such as: 90 % are headed by a male,
10 % by a female and that among the male-headed 94.7 % can read and write while only 5.3 percent among the female-headed
household. Therefore: 90*(0.947) + 10*(0.053) = 85.76% of agricultural households can read and write.
14At the national level this is slightly lower with an annual growth rate of 3.582% (estimated by CIA, 2012).
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conversion. However these studies, as all available ones, never use econometric approach to evaluate this rise
in labor input. We have only simple statistics and comparisons with conventional producers. Consequently,
there are two problems. First, these study compare organic to conventional agriculture, thus they do not
compare to traditional agriculture. Therefore for African country like Uganda, we can not use such results
since agricultural systems are absolutely not comparable. Second, simple statistics do not provide rigorous
information. For instance, if organic producers own more land than conventional producers, there is nothing
surprising they use more labor. Therefore we have to control for individual characteristics and possible
selection bias.
For Eastern Africa, Guijt and Woodhill (2008) report (. . . ) the heavy work load resulting from the organic
agriculture practices taught. In particular, gathering the organic material needed for mulching and composting
as well as establishing contour bunds was always remarked [by smallholders]. How much extra work this means
is unknown, no data was available nor could farmer informants specify numbers of hours required extra for
speciﬁc activities. In Uganda, existing studies also suggest an increase in labor requirement. Gibbon et
al. (2008) indicate that organic farmers in the pineapple scheme in central Uganda hire more labor than
control farmers. Besides Bolwig et al (2009) report that the coﬀee scheme in Eastern Uganda has changed
the repartition of the family labor. Women decrease their oﬀ-farm labor to increase their labor eﬀort in coﬀee
farming and processing. First issue, this increase in labor requirement is absolutely never quantiﬁed. Second
issue, for Uganda we do not know exactly what are the reasons behind this increase in labor input. This may
be partly motivated by higher output price that gives incentive to increase production. In this case, this is
the organic price premium that is the main explanation. Besides, organic practices and/or up-grading the
quality may also be labor intensive and explain higher labor input.
To conclude, the eﬀect on labor demand of certiﬁed organic agriculture has never been studied in the
existing literature. This is limiting and future research should rigorously quantify it in order to evaluate all
the consequences of organic agriculture. My own study is only a ﬁrst step in this investigation.
If we assume that organic agriculture raises labor requirement because of labor-intensive practices this
may be an important issue where labor supply is scarce. Nevertheless Uganda, as most African country, is
not in this case. The oﬃcial estimate about rural unemployment in Uganda is low with only 1.1 percent of
unemployed in 2005/2006 (Ubos, 2007). However, rural underemployment is estimated to 12.6 percent and
this is, in fact, this ﬁgure that is interesting for studying the rural labor situation. Despite huge diﬃculty for
estimating the share of underemployed workers, this ﬁgure indicates there is a signiﬁcant under-utilization of
the rural labor force in Uganda. Virtually everybody supplies some labor in order to support themselves and
their family but a signiﬁcant part would like to work more. Therefore we are in a sub-optimal situation and
providing productive labor opportunities is a desirable outcome. Besides, providing employment opportunities
for underemployed people has very strong potential for poverty alleviation. Indeed, these people are likely
to be those that suﬀer of the deepest poverty. Among them, landless and quasi-landless are likely to be
predominant since they disproportionately experience the most abject poverty15. Rural poor have often no
 or too little - land to meet their own needs and therefore heavily dependent on labor opportunities for
survival. In such context, job creation is a positive and valuable contribution for poverty alleviation.
The 1999/2000 National Household Survey (Ubos) found that 21 percent of rural households have zero
landholding and this is deteriorating through time (Ainembabazi, 2007). Indeed, there is an increasing
problem of land scarcity in Uganda (IFAD, 2012). Nabbumba-Nayenga (2003) reports that demographic
characteristic is identiﬁed as the mot important cause in this trend. Yet, the second cause is the sale of land
by poor people themselves. Indeed there is a bi-directional relationship between poverty and landlessness
(Ainembabazi, 2007). Land can be sold under the pressure of immediate needs. This de-accumulation of
capital worsens the situation and pushes this rural population in a deeper poverty. While organic contract
farming does not have direct inﬂuence on demographic variable, potential employment creation may provide
additional income and thus, indirectly contribute to prevent such land selling. Therefore, by providing
employment to the poorest, this help landless and other rural poor to meet their basic needs while it may
also stop this vicious poverty-trap that leads to land selling and to deepen poverty. Obviously organic contract
farming is only a small contribution and this is far to be enough to stop landlessness and solve poverty. Yet,
15See World Bank (2008). This aﬃrmation is true in most African countries. See for instance Cramer and Pontara (1998) for
Mozambique or Barrett et al. (2001) for Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Rwanda.
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in a country with 22 percent of undernourished people (FAOSTAT)16, where land is becoming a very serious
problem and where rural population is underemployed, all positive employment contribution is welcome. As
a result, if organic contract farming increases labor demand, this deserves to be stressed. This positive eﬀect
does not concern neither the scheme members nor the exporter but this enables to aﬀect positively some
other households  likely to be the poorest. Besides, contract farming has been blamed to increase inequality
through selection. Even in the Esco scheme without farmer selection from exporter  the poorest are likely
to be excluded since a minimum level of education or land is de facto required. As a result, this labor eﬀect
may weaken the rise of inequality associated with contract farming.
At last, creation of rural employment also contributes to rural stabilization. In many African countries,
the rural-urban migration is a source of important problems and therefore organic contract farming can also
bring a positive contribution on this point. Yet, as far as it is in my knowledge, this issue is not particularly
relevant for Uganda and thus, I will not detail further.
In order to summarize previous sections, the interest of this topic is threefold. First, this enable to
weaken the existing critic of contract farming that states that such arrangement increases inequality. Second,
rural employment opportunity is crucial for all poverty alleviation strategy in country with similar features
to Uganda. At last, and more importantly, this contributes to a better knowledge about organic contract
farming through a new focus.
4. The Esco's scheme
Since the general environment of the Esco organic contract farming scheme has been contextualized, I will
now present its functioning. This part is based on Gibbon and Jones (2011) and Gibbon, Lin and Jones
(2009) but I will describe here only the main features17.
The organic contract farming is located in the foothills of the Rwenzori Mountains in Bundibugyo district.
The altitude is of 635-900 meters, the average rainfall of 2150 mm per year and the average temperature
of 28-35 degrees Celsius. Cocoa is the main export crop of the district and it experiences few plant health
problems18.The district is remote and its mobile telephone and electricity coverage is poor. The organic
cocoa contract farming scheme started initially in 1997 but due to insurgency and rebel insecurity, authorities
ordered the population to move to camps for internally displaced persons. After insurgent's defeat, the scheme
was resettled in 2001, but controlled by Esco (U) Ltd. The company decides to add vanilla to the scheme
certiﬁcation in order to improve economies of scope and reduce risk, both for itself and farmers. None of the
other crops are certiﬁed.
Before the ﬁrst export in October 2002, Esco had selected eligible parishes19 based on an informal assess-
ment that includes the number of cocoa farmers and their specialization in cocoa production. Once parish
was eligible to join the scheme, there is no barrier to entry for farmers. In order to ensure the organic group
certiﬁcation, an internal control system (ICS) is used. This system is based on annual or semi-annual farm
inspections that are done by `ﬁeld oﬃcers'. These oﬃcers have been trained in organic farming methods and
monitor the compliance with organic standards and other requirements. They also supply technical advices
and information about farm practices that should enhance yield. Field oﬃcers also train some `contact farm-
ers' who run demonstration plots in each of the villages of the scheme area. Buying posts are setting into the
area and cocoa beans are bought with an organic price premium only if they have been fully fermented and
properly dried. The contract states that Esco commits to buy all high grade crops that is oﬀered by farmers.
Esco also guarantees price premium for their production and a transparent measure of quality. From the
farmers' point of view, they are free to engage in processing cocoa and selling with Esco or other sellers.
Therefore, this is not a formal membership and one expects that farmers decide to supply high quality cocoa
and sell to Esco if and only if they get beneﬁt from that.
Yet there is some diﬀerences between 2005 and 2009 (that are respectively the ﬁrst and the second round
of the survey). In 2005, only two parishes were under this scheme and this represented 1,721 registered
16This represent a slight increase compare to 1990/1992 when the share of undernourished persons was 19 percent (FAOSTAT).
17For a more careful and detailed presentation, see these two papers.
18Black pods, witches broom, swollen shoot diseases, etc. are more common where production is in large mono-cropped
plantation (Bowers et al., 2001). This is not the case in Bundibugyo district that has a more bio-diverse context.
19Ugandan administration distinguishes district, county, sub-county, parish and village level.
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members. There were only four hired ﬁeld oﬃcers and 30-40 contact farmers. The price oﬀered for organic
cocoa was 30 percent higher than conventional one of similar quality and 100 percent higher than unfermented
conventional cocoa. However, certiﬁed farmers complained that buying posts were sometimes running out of
cash and could not buy their production. In 2005, 269 tons of organic cocoa and 50 tons of uncured vanilla
have been sold to Esco. Despite the elapsing of the support from Sida20, the scheme has been extended to
other parishes and in 2009, a total of 6,950 farmers were certiﬁed21. Field oﬃcers were now 30-35, training
increased, and even a saving society has been initiated by Esco. Buying posts were always able to buy crops
and technical instruments were employed to read moisture level. Therefore, the price was not relying on
subjective assessment but based on a precise system of premium/discount depending of the moisture content.
The organic price premium was 16-18 percent higher than conventional cocoa with similar quality. Besides,
all prices have moved upwards since 2005. In 2008, the organic purchase of cocoa has risen to 2,593 tons and
thus this represents almost a tenfold increase.
Hopefully, all previous sections have enabled a better understanding and contextualization of this study
and I will now explain how farmers determine their farm labor demand.
5. How is determined the labor demand of farmer?  A simple
farm-household model
This simple model aims to illustrate how farmers allocate their labor between farm and oﬀ-farm labor supply
and how they determine the labor demand in farm. This model, mainly based on Benjamin (1992) and Blanc
et al. (2008), will enable to understand how these decisions can be aﬀected by the participation in the Esco
scheme.
When markets are complete and eﬃcient, agricultural households separate their consumption and produc-
tion decisions. Say diﬀerently, they decide independently of their labor supply (and the repartition between
farm and oﬀ-farm work) and their labor demand. Under neoclassical assumption of perfect labor market,
individuals participate in oﬀ-farm work as long as their reservation wage (i.e their marginal value of farm
labor) is less than the oﬀ-farm wage rate (Becker, 1965, Gronau, 1973). However, if labor markets are im-
perfect, consumption and production decisions (i.e labor supply and labor demand decisions) will be jointly
determined (Sadoulet et al. 1998) and farmers may not participate in the oﬀ-farm labor market even though
their reservation wage is less than the oﬀ-farm wage rate (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). In such situation, the
actual participation in oﬀ-farm labor market mainly depends on incentive and their capacity to participate
(Reardon, 1997). This is case for instance if there are substantial entry or mobility barriers with the oﬀ-farm
sector (Barrett et al., 2001). In fact, assumptions for perfect labor market are far to ﬁt with empirical
evidences in developing countries. As a result, this is very common to assume non-separability between
production and consumption decisions22. Therefore, I will not use the neoclassical model but I will assume
the non-separability of decisions through a farm-household model.
The household utility function U (.) is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable, quasi-concave, and depends posi-
tively on consumption of good C and leisure l . Besides, utility level also depends on household characteristics,
such as age and sex, represented by a vector of parameters a that is assumed to be exogenous. The price of
the consumption good is normalized by 1.
The production function of the farm is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable and convex. This is denoted
q = F (L,A) and depends positively on the labor input L and land A. Land is assumed to be ﬁxed and
exogenous. L is deﬁned such as: L =Lh+αLf where Lh corresponds to the hired labor and Lf to the family
farm labor. The output price is denoted p. The wage rate of hired labor is wa . We assume that hired labor
and family labor are perfect substitute. Yet, if α 6= 1 , they have diﬀerent eﬃciency and the two kinds of labor
are not equivalent. As a result, the total labor input L is measured in hired-labor equivalent eﬃciency. In
the case where α > 1, family labor is more eﬃcient than hired one.
The total time available to the household (T ) is allocated between leisure l , work on the farm (Lf ) and
20Esco have received the support of Sida, though the Epopa programme, cf. note 7.
21Yet, we are studying data for the 2008/2009 season and not all the 6,950 farmers were already certiﬁed to start season as
organic producer.
22For studies assuming non-separability because of missing market or constraint in the labor market, see for instance Lopez
(1984), Benjamin (1992), Jacoby (1993), Skouﬁas (1994).
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work oﬀ the farm (Lo) such as T = Lf+Lo + l. The oﬀ-farm labor wage rate is wo and is exogenous. In
the household utility function U (C , l ; a), both type of work, Lf and Lo , are perfect substitute, thus they
have exactly the same disutility23. Besides, there is an exogenous income y , that can represent for instance
received remittances.
The objective of the household is to maximize its utility U (C , l ; a) subject to time constraint (2 ), income
constraint (3 ), labor input constraint (4 ), and non-negativity constraints on labor time (5 ) (6 ). Thus, the
household's programme is deﬁned by:
Max U (C , l ; a) (1 )
{Lf ,Lo,L,Lh,C,l}
subject to:
T =Lf+Lo + l (2 )
C =pF (L,A)− waLh + woLo + y (3 )
Lh = L− αLf (4 )
Lo > 0 (5 )
Lh ≥ 0 (6 )
Let denote L , the Lagrangian associated with this programme, and λ1 , λ2 , λ3 , µ1 , µ2 the Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the constraint (2 )− (6 ).
L = U(C, l; a) +λ1 [T − Lf − Lo − l ]+λ2 [p.F (L,A)− waLh + woLo + y − C ]
+λ3 [Lh − L+ αLf ] + µ1 [Lo ] + µ2 [Lh ]
The ﬁrst order conditions for a maximum are such as:
 Consumption: ∂L∂C = UC
′ − λ2 = 0 ⇐⇒ λ2 = U
′
c (7 )
 Leisure: ∂L∂l = U
′
l − λ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ λ1 = U
′
l (8 )
Therefore from (7 ) and (8 ): λ1λ2 =
U ′l
U ′
C
= MRSl/C
This ratio is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption and represents
the reservation wage of the household.
 Oﬀ-farm labor: ∂L∂Lo = −λ1 + λ2wo + µ1 = 0 ⇐⇒
λ1
λ2
= wo +
µ1
λ2
- If µ1 = 0 ⇒ Lo > 0 , and
λ1
λ2
= wo +
µ1
λ2
⇒wo =
λ1
λ2
(10 )
⇐⇒wo = MRSl/C
In this case, household supplies oﬀ-farm labor until the oﬀ-farm wage equals the
reservation rate.
- If u1 > 0 ⇒ Lo = 0 and wo+
µ1
µ2
= λ1λ2 ⇒ wo <
λ1
λ2
(11 )
In this case, household does not supply oﬀ-farm labor because the oﬀ-farm wage is
lower than the reservation wage.
 Family farm labor: ∂L∂Lf = −λ1 + αλ3 = 0 ⇐⇒ α =
λ1
λ3
(12 )
 Labor farm demand: ∂L∂L = λ2.p.F
′
L − λ3 = 0 ⇐⇒p.F
′
L =
λ3
λ2
(13 )
 Hired labor: ∂L∂Lh = −λ2wa + λ3 + µ2 = 0 ⇐⇒wa =
λ3
λ2
+ µ2λ2
23This assumption, though common, is limiting. Indeed, Lopez (1984) and Fall and Magnac (2004) have shown that this was
generally not supported. Yet, since the very modest purposes of this model, simplicity is paramount.
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- If µ2 = 0 ⇒ Lh > 0 and wa =
λ3
λ2
According to (10 ) and (12 ), this can be rewritten such as :
wa =
λ3
λ1
· λ1λ2 =
1
α ·MRSl/C ⇐⇒ αwa = MRSl/C (14 )
- If µ2 > 0 ⇒ Lh = 0 and wa >
λ
3
λ2
⇐⇒ αwa > MRSl/C (15 )
In order to facilitate the interpretation of these ﬁrst order conditions, I will distinguish four diﬀerent cases.
α is assumed to be superior to one, thus the family farm labor is more eﬃcient than hired farm labor.
 First case: Lo = 0 and Lh = 0 , the household neither hires nor sells labor.
From (11 ), we know that Lo = 0 ⇒ wo < MRSl/c and from (15 ), Lh = 0 ⇒ wa >
1
αMRSl/c .
Therefore, in this ﬁrst case : wo < MRSl/C < αwa .
In this case, only the family supplies labor in the farm: L = Lf . Indeed, the agricultural wage is too high
compare to the marginal productivity in the farm and therefore the household does not hire labor. However,
the family does not supply oﬀ-farm labor because the oﬀ-farm wage is too low.
This autarky case is only possible when Lf ≥ L*, i.e. the optimal farm labor input is lower or equals the
family labor supply. If Lf > L* this is a common case of underemployment or surplus labor. In a case
of perfect market, only L∗ would have been employed since this quantity maximizes the proﬁt. Yet, given
imperfect market and since the oﬀ-farm opportunity has insuﬃcient return, family members prefer work
on-farm.
 Second case: Lo > 0 and Lh = 0 , the household supplies some oﬀ-farm labor but does not hire labor.
From (10 ), Lo > 0⇒wo =MRSl/C and from (15 ), Lh = 0 ⇒ wa >
1
αMRSl/c .
From (13 ), the optimal farm labor demand is: p.F ′L =
λ3
λ2
.
Therefore, in this second case, the optimal repartition implies that household supplies oﬀ-farm labor from
the point where p.F ′L =
λ3
λ2
= 1αwo (the optimal labor on farm) to the point wo =MRSl/C (where household
does not want supply additional labor).
Besides, household does not hire labor. Indeed from (13 ), p.F ′L =
λ3
λ2
and from (15 ) : wa >
λ
3
λ2
, we get:
p.F ′L < wa . Therefore, the agricultural wage is too high to make optimal the use of additional hired labor in
the farm . Hence, all the farm labor is supplied by the family.
 Third case: Lo = 0 and Lh > 0 , the household supplies only family farm labor and hires labor.
From (11 ), we know that Lo = 0 ⇒ wo < MRSl/c and from (14 ), Lh > 0⇒ wa =
1
αMRSl/C
Therefore the oﬀ-farm wage is too low to be attractive for family members. Besides, the optimal farm labor
input is such as:
p.F ′L =
λ3
λ2
= 1αMRSl/C . By substitutingMRSl/C from(14 ), we get: p.F
′
L = wa . The household supplies
family labor until p.F ′L = MRSl/C and from this point up to p.F
′
L = wa , the household hires labor.
 Fourth case: Lo > 0 and Lh > 0 , the household supplies labor oﬀ-farm while simultaneously hires labor
in farm.
From (10 ), Lo > 0⇒wo =MRSl/C and from (14 ), Lh > 0⇒ αwa = MRSl/C . Therefore we have a situation
such as: wo = αwa . Household is indiﬀerent between working on the farm or oﬀ-farm, and can chose to
supply labor oﬀ-farm while hiring labor. In this case, we can not determine exactly the allocation. This case
with simultaneity of hiring labor and supplying oﬀ-farm labor is rather uncommon and, for simplicity, this
marginal case will not be taken into account.
The participation in the Esco scheme can aﬀect this repartition in two ways. First, the farm production
function can become more labor intensive. This means that, if the quantity of input is similar, this new
production function F2 (.) will be such as: F2 (L,A) <F1 (L,A) (thus output quantity decreases with this new
production function) and F ′2L > F
′
1L. The second possible change with the participation in the scheme is
linked to a rise in the output price p (either because of organic premium or because of improvement in cocoa
quality).
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We know from (13 ), that the optimal labor demand for farm production is such as: p.F ′L =
λ3
λ2
. As a result,
these two possible changes - an increase in p or in F ′
L
- act in the same way on the decision of labor supply
and demand.
If the ratio λ3λ2 remains constant, labor demand in the farm increases unambiguously after such change
24.
Besides, since wo is exogenous, we get from the ﬁrst order conditions a change in the repartition of the
household labor supply. If there is only an increase in the output price p, household may decide to only
increase their consumption of leisure and thus this may lead to a decrease of the labor family supply. Yet,
family members may also decide to work more (and decrease their leisure) or to work the same quantity but
allocating more labor in the farm and less oﬀ- farm. Therefore, the ﬁnal eﬀect typically depends on λ1 , λ2 , λ3
that are respectively the shadow price of time, consumption and labor.
As a result, if labor demand increases due to organic contract farming, we should see empirically change
going in this direction such as: increasing family farm labor and/or rise in hired labor, decrease in oﬀ-farm
supply and/or leisure consumption. The ﬁnale eﬀect depends on the initial case (case 1 to 3) and on these
shadow prices.
This model is very simple, and aims only to give the main intuitions.25. Yet, before the empirical
investigation, I need to introduce the concept of exchange labor that I will use afterward. Exchange labor
is simply an arrangement between farmers about the provision of labor that does not involve payment in
cash or in kind. The household supplies labor in other farms in exchange of labor in their own farm. As
far as I know, any agricultural household model has introduced exchange labor into the modelisation. In
fact, most of literature simply ignores the question since determinants of exchange labor are ambiguous and
mainly dependent on social factors (Gilligan, 2004).
6. Methodology for empirical investigation
Data collection
Data come from two rounds of survey, the ﬁrst one in 2005 and the second one in 2009. They have been
collected by Gibbon, Lin and Jones. This survey provides respectively data on 55 households in 2005 and
167 in 2009. As a result my estimates are based on a small sample size. I will detail in this part the process
for the 2005 survey. Even though I do not possess detail of the methodology for the second round, they have
processed in a similar way. Households surveyed in 2009 are not similar to those of the ﬁrst round but have
been selected following similar methods.
In 2005, cocoa producers in the Bundibugyo district are about 8-10,000. Around half of them are localized
in four parishes26. Two of them, Burondo and Ngamba, are the two parishes selected by the Esco scheme.
The other two parishes are Mirambi and Busaru and are made up of traditional farmers, neither organically
certiﬁed nor members of any contract farming scheme. As sampling frame, six villages from these four
parishes have been used. Initially, all villages of each parish were listed and then categorized into one of
three altitude bands. Then, one organic and one traditional villages were randomly chosen from each
altitude band. Within each of these six villages, systematic sampling was used to select 10 households for
interview. This systematic sampling was done based on a list of certiﬁed households provided by Esco or on
a list provided by village leaders for the traditional villages. They were asked to provide the name of all
cocoa-growing households, rich and poor. The sample from the traditional villages is the control group
that I will use in the empirical investigation. A detailed questionnaire has been addressed to the household's
head and covered a large set of information including household demographics, revenue, farm characteristics,
etc. In a few cases, household's head were unavailable and their spouse were instead interviewed. In two or
three cases in both groups, where spouse was also unavailable, substitute household was used by taking the
24Yet, if the ratio λ3
λ2
increases in the same proportion - or relatively more - than p.F ′L, this is possible that farm labor demand
does not increase.
25Limits of this model are multiple but since its really modest aim, simplicity is paramount. One limit is that household
members are treated as homogenous while this does not ﬁt with evidences. For instance, Bagamba et al.(2009) found in their
study in Uganda that a rise in the output price leads to an increase in the husband's labor supply while this has a negative
impact on wife's work eﬀort  since they do not control the beneﬁt of farm work. On the contrary, Gibbon et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that this is the wife that increases the labor supply in the farm. As a whole, evidence agrees about the heterogeneity between
household members that is not taken into account in this model.
26These estimates have been done by Esco and Bundibugyo district agricultural oﬃce.
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household's name that was listed immediately after those originally chosen. An important and limiting point
for my topic is that survey did not collect data on family labor input. Indeed, this is common in farm-budget
related survey in Africa because of three main reasons (Bolwig et al, 2009). First, households ﬁnd more
diﬃcult to recall family labor input than hired or exchange labor ones. In addition, they have diﬃculty to
attribute accurately time values for some labor tasks done only by family (such as supervision). At last,
this is not accurate to attribute a common metrics for labor done by children and by adults. This survey
has not been done for my speciﬁc focus and therefore this is not surprising that data limits my empirical
investigation.
Descriptive statistics
The sample is constituted by 55 households for the 2005 survey round with 28 certiﬁed and 27 control
households and by 167 households, with 89 certiﬁed and 78 control ones, for the 2009 survey round. By
comparing the mean value of some key variables (Table 1) we see that, among other things, the number
of organic practices is higher for organic certiﬁed farmers. Yet this is striking to observe that ﬁrstly, the
adoption of organic practices has been particularly low and secondly, that certiﬁed organic farmers decrease
the use of organic practice over time. This is of course limiting since some key beneﬁts of organic agriculture
stem from these practices. For my focus this may also be limiting because with so little information, variation
may be insuﬃcient to identify and quantify the eﬀect of organic practices on labor input. We also notice that
certiﬁed households are relatively larger (due to both a larger number of members above and under 6 years
old) and has a older household's head. They also have slightly bigger farms, with more productive cocoa
trees and vanilla vines. Therefore, econometric estimate has to control for these household characteristics.
Their total gross crop revenue as well as their net cocoa revenue is also signiﬁcantly higher27. In addition
the share of cocoa that is fully or semi-fermented and the average price are signiﬁcantly higher and increase
over time for both groups. Besides, certiﬁed farmers are relatively less specialized in cocoa and vanilla, even
though this specialization increases highly over time.
Hypothesis
The goal of this empirical analysis is to determine whether or not the participation into the Esco organic
contract farming scheme increases the farm labor demand. Therefore the main hypothesis is:
Hypothesis I  After controlling for relevant determinants, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in farm labor input between certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed farmers.
Yet, I will go further by trying to determine what the channels of this increase in labor demand are. I
will therefore test three sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis I-a.  After controlling for relevant determinants, this diﬀerence in farm labor
input is explained by the organic price premium oﬀered to the certiﬁed farmers.
Hypothesis I-b.  After controlling for relevant determinants, this diﬀerence in farm labor
input is explained by the higher quality cocoa supplied by certiﬁed farmers.
Hypothesis I-c.  After controlling for relevant determinants, this diﬀerence in farm labor
input is due to a higher use of organic farming practices that are labor intensive.
Analytical method
For this empirical estimation, we are facing several challenges. The main one is to evaluate the eﬀect of the
participation in the scheme without selection bias. Indeed, the setting of this scheme is non-experimental and
thus participation cannot be assumed purely random. In fact, there are three potential sources of selection
27see Gibbon and Jones (2011) for a rigorous studies about the eﬀect of certiﬁcation on these variables.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 2005
Variable (means) Unit Certified Non certified test
Respondents count 28 27
Number of organic practices count 1.1 0.1 -4.6***
Age of household head years 50.4 41 -2.6***
Household member >6 yrs old count 7.5 5.7 -2.5**
Dependent (< 6 yrs old) count 2.8 2 -1.2
Persons in household count 10.3 7.7 -2.5**
Size whole farm ha 2.45 2.12 -0.7
Productive cocoa trees count 1302.1 1280.6 -0,4
Productive vanilla vines count 16.6 11.6 -1.6**
Total gross crop revenue 1000 USh 1507 995 -1.7**
Net cocoa revenue 1000 USh 1185 640 -2.2**
Cocoa revenue in total revenue percent 87.6 97.5 2.6***
Other crops in total crop revenue percent 6.9 1.6 -1.5
All equipment cost 1000 USh 25 39 1.5
Cocoa fully or semi-fermented percent 74.6 46.8 -2.1**
Cocoa price 1000 USh/kg 1.3 1 -3.5***
2009
Variable (means) Unit Certified Non certified test
Respondents count 89 78
Number of organic practices count 0.6 0.5 -0.7
Age of household head years 48.7 38.6 -4.7***
Household member >6 yrs old count 6.1 5.5 -1.6
Dependent (< 6 yrs old) count 1.9 2.3 1.7*
Persons in household count 8 7.8 -0.4
Size whole farm ha 2.47 2.41 -0.5
Productive cocoa trees count 1323.4 1276.8 -1.7*
Productive vanilla vines count 180.7 34.9 -5.6***
Total gross crop revenue 1000 USh 1854 766 -7.1***
Net cocoa revenue 1000 USh 1643 589 -7.8***
Cocoa revenue in total revenue percent 93.5 92.2 0,9*
Other crops in total crop rev. percent 0.8 4.1 2**
All equipment cost 1000 USh 40 50 -1.7*
Cocoa fully or semi-fermented percent 98 65.7 -8.2***
Cocoa price 1000 USh/kg 2 1.7 -8***
Note: Net cocoa revenue is the gross sales revenue minus the variable cost of labor
and equipment. Other crops indicates crops other than cocoa and vanilla ones.
Cocoa price is the average price received by producers. Cocoa fully or
semi-fermented is the share of this type of cocoa on total cocoa production.
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bias. Firstly, the programme placement has been chosen by Esco's managers. Hence, this endogenous
placement has to be taken into account. Secondly, all producers from these selected parishes have chosen
whether to participate or not in the scheme. Such decision may be linked to household's speciﬁc characteristics
such as lower risk aversion, more entrepreneurial mind, etc. Thus, these households may be more incline to
hire more labor, regardless of their participation in the scheme. Thirdly, there is a geographical heterogeneity.
Among other things, soil productivity or access to road and other infrastructures can play a signiﬁcant role.
If certiﬁed farmers are those owning the most fertile lands, they intrinsically need to use more labor input,
and this should not be confounded with the eﬀect of participation that I want to evaluate.
As a result the evaluation problem can be expressed by a system of equations that represents the outcome
of interest (y) and a selection equation for treatment (t) over observation i such as:
y1i = x
′
iβ1+µ1i (1 )
y0i =x
′
iβ0 + µ0i (2 )
ti =1(z
′
iβ1 + vi > 0 ) (3 )
The equation (3 ) - the selection equation - is an indicator function that takes the value 1 for treated
household for which z ′β1 + vi > 0 and 0 otherwise. The selection factors correspond to zi and explain the
participation. y1i is the outcome for treated respondent for which ti = 1 and y0i is the outcome for control
household for which ti = 0 .
This system can be summarized by :
yi =x
′
iβ0 + tix
′
i(β1 − β0 ) + µ0i + ti(µ1i − µ0i) (4 )
Besides, I will assume that treatment eﬀect is only through the intercept of the joint outcome equation
(thus treatment does not aﬀect the slope of the regression line) such as : β1 = β0 = β. This common as-
sumption is reasonable is my case since the scheme is relatively recent and thus, there is a strong similarity
between the control and treatment groups. This leads to the reduced form:
yi = x
′
iβ + tiα+µ0i + t(µ1i−µ0i) (5 )
where α captures the treatment eﬀect that represents the diﬀerence in intercept due to treatment.
Controlling fully and directly for all sources of bias in the estimation is an eﬃcient way to address selection
problem. To make realistic such identiﬁcation procedure, all elements that explained this endogenous selection
have to be observable and included in the regression. Nevertheless, this is possible that these elements are
not fully observable in the data. If this is the case, econometric approach has to correct this bias. One way
to address this issue is to ﬁnd valid instruments for scheme participation and to use an instrumental variable
(IV) approach28.
Given the three potential sources of bias, I will use two instruments to control for the participation in
the scheme when this will be required. One instrument is controlling for the endogenous placement and
geographical heterogeneity and another one is controlling for household characteristics. The ﬁrst instrument
is the variable called 'Village' that takes a value between 1 and 30 depending on which village the surveyed
household comes from. Indeed, this is relevant to chose an instrument for location characteristic given
that only inhabitants of eligible places have the possibility to join the scheme. Besides, the village level is
appropriated since geographical heterogeneity within the same village is likely to be small. Given its limited
size, soil fertility or access to infrastructure for instance are likely to be rather similar. Nevertheless, since
Esco has selected parishes (that consist of several villages), it is legitimate to be worried between a collinearity
between a dummy variable that represents the participation in the scheme  'Certiﬁcation' the main regressor
of interest  and this location variable 'Village'. Indeed, given the free entry into the scheme, we may think
that almost all inhabitants of selected places are certiﬁed and therefore this instrument `Village' can not
be used. Yet, correlation between the two variables is about - 0.45 and variance inﬂation factor does not
indicate anything worrying29. As a result, living in a selected parish does not automatically imply to be
a certiﬁed farmer, even though this is a necessary condition. This instrument can thus control properly
for the placement and geographical bias. The second instrument is a dummy variable, called 'Education',
28For literature about instrumental variables, see for instance Baum et al. (2007), Cameron and Trivedi (2005; 2009, chap.
6), Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, 2004), Greene (2008, chap. 12), and Wooldridge (2002, 2009).
29The tolerance (1/VIF) is 0.7965 and the mean VIF is 1.26.
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that takes the value 1 if the household's head has received schooling at the primary level. This variable
may capture some household characteristics that explain the participation in the Esco scheme. Of course,
these two instruments are only proxy for the three sources of bias but they are well correlated with the
main regressor of interest (`Certiﬁcation') and should not be related to the other variables (dependent and
regressors) of our model30.
The empirical investigation will be separated in two parts: the ﬁrst one will investigate about hypothesis
I, and the second one about hypotheses I- a. b. c. I will study four dependent variables that give indications
about the farm labor demand, namely the total labor cost, the dummy variable indicating if the household
hires labor, the number of household members that are working oﬀ-farm and the dummy variable that
indicates practice of exchange labor. Given these are continuous, binary and count variables, diﬀerent
econometric approaches will be used and I will explain them each time. As far as it is possible, I will
use alternative estimation method in order to ensure the robustness of my result.
7. Empirical estimation
A. Evaluation of participation in the Esco scheme on labor demand
a. Labor cost
The ﬁrst dependent variable is the total farm labor cost of producers. This labor cost includes payment for
hired labor that is used for harvesting, weeding, planting and other preparatory works. In addition, this also
includes the value of exchange labor for harvesting and weeding, that are the usual tasks for this kind of
labor. This exchange labor does not provide cash payment but reference wage rate for similar work can easily
be taken. Besides, no estimate has been done about family labor cost. As common in farm survey, there is
no try for doing so since households have typically great diﬃculty to recall their labor input. In addition,
there is an absence of reference materials for wage rate for tasks such as supervision or monitoring that are
almost never done by hired labor. This is obviously limiting, but we can still have very useful information
on external labor input through this variable.
For the empirical implementation, a set of regressors about characteristics will be used. These regressors
potentially aﬀect the farm labor cost and we have to control for. These are: the logarithm of the farm size
(acres), the age of the household's head, a dummy variable taking the value one if the household's head is a
male and another one to know if all the household members work on the family farm. This is justiﬁed since
family that does not supply oﬀ-farm labor may exhibit some speciﬁc characteristics. I also control for the
number of dependent household members (i.e. members of less than 6 years old), the number of household
members working within the farm as main occupation, the share of revenue that does not come from vanilla
or cocoa (i.e. we control for the specialization into the crop production concerned by the Esco scheme), the
period and the number of organic practices. The survey informs about the four more common practices,
namely the use of manure, bio-pesticides, mulching and soil conservation practices. Other practices exist
but they are likely to be very marginally used either by certiﬁed or by control farmers. In addition, the
main regressor of interest (`Certification') is a dummy variable taking the value one if producer is certiﬁed
(i.e. participate in the organic contract farming scheme). All prices used in this study are expressed in 2005
prices. They have been deﬂated using Consumer Price Index, Mbarara for all items (Ubos)31.
Despite there is a priori an endogeneity issue with the `Certiﬁcation' regressor due to the three sources
of bias speciﬁed earlier, I have to verify whether this issue can signiﬁcantly bias my result. After running
a simple OLS regression, a DurbinWuHausman test (Wu, 1974 and Hausman, 1978) conﬁrms that the
variable 'Certiﬁcation' is endogenous and biases estimate. I also run tests in order to ensure the validity of
my regression32 as well as a White (1980) test for heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of homoskedascticity
is rejected (p-value equals 0.05). Hence, this is another source of potential bias that has to be corrected.
30In addition, each time I use these instruments, various tests are done in order to ensure their adequacy. All tests indicate
that they are good instruments and they enable to correct for endogeneity bias of 'Certiﬁcation'.
31All prices are expressed in Ugandan Shillings (USh). For 2005, the average exchange rate was US$1 = 1778 USh)
32The general Ramsey Reset speciﬁcation test for the linear regression (Ramsey, J.B, 1969) conﬁrms there is no apparent issue
about the speciﬁcation. Correlogram of all our explanatory variable does not appear worrying at all (the higher correlation is
as low as 0.33).
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As a result, an IV approach seems adapted in this case for correcting endogeneity of `Certiﬁcation'. For-
mally, the model can be deﬁned by:
LabCosti = Certificationiβ1+x1iβ2+µi (1 )
Certificationi = x1iγ1+x2iγ2+εi
Where LabCost represents the total labor cost, Certification is the endogenous regressor, x1i represents
the included exogenous regressors and x2i represents the excluded exogenous regressors (namely Education
andVillage). The error terms µi and εi have a mean equal to zero but the correlation between µi and εi is
presumably nonzero.
As instrumental variable (IV) approach, a limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation will
be used. Indeed the LIML estimate has the same asymptotic distribution than the common two-stage least-
squares one (2SLS) but has better small sample properties33. Given the small sample size, this instrumental
variable (IV) approach is the most adequate for this sample. Nevertheless, since LIML is basically a linear
combination of the OLS and 2SLS estimates  weighted in such way that it reduces the 2SLS bias  usual
assumptions for OLS should not be violated to ensure consistent estimate. As a result, using a robust
standard error34 with a LIML estimate seems adapted at this situation.
Table 1: Eﬀect of certiﬁcation on total labor cost
LIML Two step
main
Certiﬁcation 66.58+ (1.64) 64.86+ (1.62)
Practice -36.20+ (-1.78) -32.19+ (-1.91)
Period 74.86∗ (2.10) 91.42∗∗ (2.86)
Hh_farmlab -10.34 (-0.39) 2.188 (0.08)
Hh_depend 5.733 (0.93) 4.389 (0.65)
Farm_size 210.9∗∗∗ (8.88) 206.0∗∗∗ (9.22)
Age -3.511∗∗∗ (-3.44) -3.510∗∗∗ (-3.50)
Male -117.1∗ (-2.29) -112.4+ (-1.94)
Farmonly -67.39+ (-1.90) -67.70∗ (-1.97)
Revshare_othrcrop 1.388 (0.80) 1.327 (0.92)
_cons 228.6∗ (2.49) 201.0∗ (2.07)
Certiﬁcation
Village -0.0222+ (-1.65)
Education -6.375 (-0.03)
Farm_size 0.337+ (1.77)
Age 0.0295∗∗∗ (3.60)
_cons 4.182 (0.02)
hazard
lambda -94.73∗∗ (-2.93)
N 220 220
R2 0.375
adj. R2 0.346
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: The ﬁrst level of signiﬁcance is set at 11 percent because the p-value given for 'Certiﬁcation' is p = 0.102.
The dependent variable is 'LabCost'.
Sources: Author's calculation, using Stata 11.
+ p < 0.11, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
33See Flores-Lagunes (2007) for an extensive Monte Carlo study that suggests that LIML does at least as well as all the others
alternatives in a broad range of circumstances.
34For robust standard error, Stata 11 uses by default the Newey-West (1987) standard error. This is an extension of the
classic Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimator (White, 1980) that also produces consistent estimates when there is
autocorrelation.
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This ﬁrst estimation indicates that the participation in the scheme has a positive eﬀect on the labor input
cost of producers. The p-value is 0.102, which can be round up to 0.10, thus we can conclude that this result
is signiﬁcant at 10 percent level35. Most coeﬃcients exhibit expected sign. For instance, the size farm as a
strong signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labor input cost while the fact to be a male's headed household decreases it.
Yet, two important points can be stressed. First, the number of organic practices has a negative eﬀect on
labor cost. This is rather contradictory on what is expected. However, as already stressed, the adoption of
these four main kinds of organic practice (mulching, bio-pesticide, manure and soil conservation practice) is
extremely low. The average number of practices in 2005 and 2009 is respectively 0.51 and 0.53 and this is
possibly too little to provide reliable information. If there is not enough variation in the variable, econometric
estimate faces diﬃculty to provide meaningful result. The second point is that 'Period' has a positive eﬀect
on the total labor cost. Despite prices have been deﬂated with the Consumer Price Index (Ubos), producers
in 2009 spend more than those in 2005. There are various explanations but one of them is that control farmers
have beneﬁt of spillovers from the Esco scheme. Processing techniques for instance have been increasingly
spread among them (Gibbon and Jones, 2011), and the output price has therefore risen due to higher quality
and perhaps higher competition for middlemen that bought cocoa to farmers. The presence of Esco scheme
in the region is likely to have inﬂuenced these factors (see Gibbon and Jones, 2011) and this may explain the
general higher use of external labor through time.
In order to ensure the robustness of this result, I will use an alternative estimation method: a treatment-
eﬀects model. This approach tries to get eﬃciency gain by using a diﬀerent modeling of the equation system.
Here, the binary endogenous variable (`Certiﬁcation' ) is estimated with a probit method. This is the usual
robustness-vs-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ. If the probit equation is correctly speciﬁed then this estimate will be more
eﬃcient than the IV approach. If this is mispeciﬁed, treatment eﬀects estimate will be inconsistent (while
IV estimate is consistent in both cases). Besides, treatment-eﬀects model can be used either with a two-step
consistent estimates or with the full maximum likelihood. The latter one (called also FIML estimate) assumes
that errors of the two equations (selection and outcome equations) are jointly normally distributed. If this
is true, estimator is consistent and eﬃcient. If not, this is not consistent anymore. On the contrary, the
two-step approach (called also two-step Heckman model) does not do this demanding assumption about joint
normality and therefore is much more often consistent. Yet, this estimate will be ineﬃcient if indeed this
assumption is true. Consequently, I think a two-step treatment eﬀects model is a good trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and consistency and provide an interesting alternative to the ﬁrst estimate. The selection equation
is made of the two excluded instruments ('Education' and 'Village' ), 'Farm_Size' and 'Age' 36. This second
estimate provides results that are very close to the ﬁrst one and conﬁrms its robustness. As a result, these
estimates indicate that participation in the organic contract farming scheme has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on the cost of hired and exchange labor in the farm.
b. Use of hired labor
The second dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the household hires labor or not.
We expect that participation in the scheme creates employment opportunities and therefore one possible
manifestation of this can be through a positive eﬀect on this dependent variable. For this second regression,
almost similar regressors are used in order to control for household's characteristics. However, a diﬀerent
econometric approach is required since the dependent variable is now a binary variable and not a continuous
one as previously. For such dependent variable, a probit estimate is better suited than OLS approach. The
goodness-of-ﬁt test conﬁrms that a probit model is adapted for this estimation. Besides there is no collinearity
problem and heteroskedasticity of error terms is not signiﬁcant37. In order to assess the endogeneity of
`Certiﬁcation', a Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity38 is done. Since the null hypothesis of exogeneity is
accepted, endogeneity should not signiﬁcantly bias my estimate. As a result a simple probit regression should
35The variable `CostLab' is the square root of the total cost of all labor. Therefore, participation in the organic contract
farming scheme is associated with an increase in the labor cost of (66.58)², i.e. of 4 432 USh per year.
36Introduction of the other explanatory variables is not particularly relevant. Indeed, when I do so, coeﬃcients of these
additional variables appear to be highly insigniﬁcant. Besides, a reverse causality is also possible in the case of the number of
organic practice for instance. Nevertheless, even with the introduction of other variables, I obtain very similar coeﬃcient.
37No formal test has been run but coeﬃcient estimates are exactly similar with or without the robust standard errors option.
Thus, heteroskedasticity does not signiﬁcantly bias result. The goodness-of-ﬁt test is provided with the command -estat gof-
(Stata 11).
38The exogeneity test is given by the command probexog-.
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provide an adequate estimate. As an alternative approach, I decide to control for this potential endogeneity
bias of `Certiﬁcation'  even though this bias should not be signiﬁcant according to the Smith-Blundell test.
Usual IV approach is only for continuous dependent variable and the IV probit approach through Maximum
likelihood estimation ﬁts only for continuous endogenous variable. In such case, Greene (2000, pp.852-855)
has clearly shown that doing the estimation jointly via a bivariate probit is an adequate way to solve the
endogeneity problem. Therefore I will use a bivariate probit estimation as alternative approach39.
Table 2: Regression result for the eﬀect of certiﬁcation on the use of hired labor
Probit Bivariate probit
HireLab
Certiﬁcation 0.689+ (1.91) 0.819+ (1.84)
Period -0.440 (-1.06) -0.402 (-0.95)
Practice -0.231 (-1.51) -0.228 (-1.49)
Hh_farmlab -0.675∗ (-2.16) -0.660∗ (-2.12)
Hh_depend 0.0685 (1.04) 0.0653 (0.98)
Cocoa_trees 1.243∗∗∗ (4.82) 1.232∗∗∗ (4.75)
Vanilla_vines 0.0564 (0.36) 0.0559 (0.36)
Age -0.0312∗∗ (-3.14) -0.0320∗∗ (-3.19)
Male -0.135 (-0.21) -0.116 (-0.18)
Farmonly -0.546 (-1.50) -0.537 (-1.48)
Revshare_othrcrop 0.0234 (1.50) 0.0244 (1.55)
_cons -5.580∗∗ (-3.07) -5.633∗∗ (-3.09)
Certiﬁcation
Village -0.0407∗ (-2.04)
Education -6.910 (-0.00)
Farm_size 0.546+ (1.83)
Age 0.0164 (1.22)
_cons 5.373 (0.00)
athrho
_cons -0.196 (-0.48)
N 130 130
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: Cocoa_trees and Vanilla_vines represent the logarithm of the number of productive cocoa trees and vanilla vines.
Sources: Author's calculation, using Stata 11.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
With a p-value of 0.057, the coeﬃcient of `Certiﬁcation' is signiﬁcant at 10 percent level. Thus, this
regression indicates a positive eﬀect on the fact of using hired labor for certiﬁed farmers. Probit estimate
does not provide very intuitive result and this probit estimate has been done to see the sign of the coeﬃcient
rather than quantifying this eﬀect40. The signiﬁcant positive eﬀect is also conﬁrmed by the alternative
estimate. As a result, the participation in the Esco scheme signiﬁcantly increases the probability of using
hired labor. Intuitively, this is in line with the hypothesis that organic contract farming scheme increases
labor requirement and creates employment opportunities. Of course, this is not a rigorous proof of that since
more producers can have use hired labor but, as a whole, less labor can be hired. Yet, with the previous
result this may be a useful indication.
39Bivariate probit estimation is given by -biprobit- (Stata 11).
40Indeed given the small sample size and given the purpose of this study, I think we should not put too much weight to the
exact coeﬃcient provided by this probit estimation. Yet, the coeﬃcient is about 0.69 thus, this implies that a one standard
deviation increase in the 'Certiﬁcation' variable produces a 0.2199 standard deviation increase in the underlying latent variable
'HireLab'. The 0.2199 is given by the column bStdXY after doing the command -listcoef- following the probit estimation.
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c. Use of exchange labor
The ﬁrst estimation has found that the total cost of labor input (exchange and hired labor) increases with
the participation in the contact farming scheme. As a result, this increase may have been done through the
rise in exchange labor, hired labor, or both. Last result seems support the increase in the hired labor and
this may be interesting to examine the change in exchange labor use. Since the dependent variable 'ExchLab'
is also a dummy variable, the same econometric approach as `HireLab' can be used. The goodness-of-ﬁt test
is good, correlations between regressors are low and error terms seem homoskedastic. A Smith-Blundell test
indicates the exogeneity of 'Certiﬁcation' and thus a simple probit estimation is the most adequate method.
As alternative approach, I use a bivariate probit (or 'biprobit') because if, despite the Smith Blundell test,
endogeneity biases the probit estimate, the biprobit one will be more adequate.
Table 3: Eﬀect of certiﬁcation on the use of exchange labor and on the number of household members woking
oﬀ-farm
Probit Bivariate probit IV Poisson
main
Certiﬁcation -0.610∗ (-2.25) -0.658+ (-1.65) -0.239 (-0.37)
Period 0.460 (1.46) 0.455 (1.43) 0.515 (0.94)
Practice 0.192 (1.33) 0.193 (1.34) 0.721∗∗ (3.03)
Hh_farmlab -0.302 (-1.24) -0.303 (-1.24) -0.212 (-0.54)
Hh_depend 0.0351 (0.58) 0.0356 (0.59) 0.0629 (0.59)
Farm_size -0.124 (-0.62) -0.120 (-0.59) -0.200 (-0.61)
Age -0.00760 (-0.93) -0.00700 (-0.78) 0.00216 (0.13)
Male 0.278 (0.48) 0.278 (0.48) -0.633 (-0.65)
Farmonly 0.336 (1.03) 0.332 (1.02)
Revshare_othrcrop 0.00428 (0.33) 0.00412 (0.32) -0.0244 (-0.83)
_cons -1.038 (-1.14) -1.038 (-1.14) -1.149 (-0.63)
Certiﬁcation
Village -0.0220 (-1.63)
Education -7.257 (-0.00)
Farm_size 0.337+ (1.77)
Age 0.0295∗∗∗ (3.61)
_cons 5.062 (0.00)
athrho
_cons 0.0633 (0.16)
N 220 220 220
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: The dependent variable for the Probit and Biprobit regression is 'HireLab'.
The dependent variable for the IV Poisson regression is 'Hh_nonfarmlab'.
Sources: Author's calculation, using Stata 11.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The negative coeﬃcient for the variable `Certiﬁcation' implies that certiﬁed farmers are less involved in
exchange labor system than control farmers. The p-value associated to this coeﬃcient is 0.025 and therefore
this result is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The biprobit estimate also provides a signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcient at the 10 percent level. Therefore, whatever the signiﬁcance of the bias due to the non-random
participation in the scheme, this participation has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the likelihood of using
exchange labor.
Exchange labor has been little studied in the literature (Gilligan, 2004) and therefore I do not have the
exact keys to properly interpret why the participation in the scheme may have this negative eﬀect on the
exchange labor. However, sociologists such as Erasmus (1956, 1961) have stressed that one of the primary
determinants of this arrangement is to avoid cash payment. In this case, this may be a possible explanation.
Nevertheless, the important information provided by this regression is not here. If we assume that this dummy
variable is a good indicator of the general use of exchange labor  i.e. 'Certiﬁcation' is also associated with
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a lower quantity of exchange labor input  this implies that the total rise in labor cost is only justiﬁed by a
much higher use of hired labor since exchange labor use has declined in the meanwhile. Of course, I recognize
that results obtained in these last two regressions (with `HireLab' and `ExchLab' as dependent variables)
do not necessarily imply such conclusion. Certiﬁed farmers using exchange labor may have increased the
quantity of exchange labor input while some of them have stopped using this kind of arrangement. However,
I think this is indicative and gives a tool to interpret the ﬁrst result. Intuitively, this result is in line with the
expectation that organic contract farming increases labor demand but also creates employment opportunities.
d. Number of household members working oﬀ-farm
Hired and exchange labor are the only ones to be valued and quantiﬁed in this survey. However, the main
labor input in household's farm comes from the family members. If farm labor demand increases, one possible
expression of this increase is through a rise in the family labor input. They may increase their farm labor
either through decreasing their leisure or their oﬀ-farm labor time. The last variable that I will examine is
thus the number of household members that are working oﬀ-farm. This may provide indication about how
their labor allocation is aﬀected and this may support the hypothesis that organic contract farming increases
the labor demand.
Since the dependent variable is a count variable, a Poisson estimation may potentially be used. Yet,
the Poisson distribution assumes that its means equals its variance, and this is a very strong assumption.
Nevertheless, the goodness-of-ﬁt test conﬁrms that Poisson distribution is well adapted here. We also test
for the exogeneity of `Certiﬁcation' with a DurbinWuHausman test. At the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance,
the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected and therefore endogeneity signiﬁcantly bias result with a simple
Poisson estimation. As a result, I will use an IV approach adapted for a Poisson distribution41. For this
regression, the regressor 'Farmonly' has been dropped oﬀ. Indeed this dummy variable does not have any
sense for explaining the number of household members working oﬀ-farm. Since the dependent variable is a
count variable and there is an endogenous binary regressor, no alternative regression is proposed. As far as
it is in my knowledge, no other approach is adapted in such case.
The coeﬃcient for `Certiﬁcation' provided by this regression is highly insigniﬁcant. The p-value is 0.709
and therefore it seems that participation in the scheme does not signiﬁcantly impact the dependent variable.
Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient is negative and therefore the participation in the scheme may tend to decrease
the number of household members working oﬀ-farm. Yet, data are relatively imprecise since this dependent
variable only counts members having a primary occupation that is not in the farm. This does not mean that
these members do not work at all on farm. By itself this estimate is not meaningful for drawing any conclu-
sion. However, it may be useful to stress that, in the literature, there is absolutely no qualitative evidence
that family decreases their farm labor input with organic farming. On the contrary, several studies, including
the ones in Africa, report that farmers have increased their load of farm work (See section 3). As a result
this negative sign, added with the three previous regressions, goes toward supporting the main hypothesis.
To conclude, a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect from the participation in the Esco scheme on the labor cost has
been rigorously shown. This ﬁrst estimation provides the main support for accepting Hypothesis I. Besides,
certiﬁed farmers are signiﬁcantly less engaged in the exchange labor system while more engaged in the hiring
of labor. This is not a rigorous proof but these two results seem indicate that certiﬁed farmers use less
exchange labor while using more hired labor than non-certiﬁed ones. In such case, their higher total labor
cost  made of exchange and hired labor - consists of lower exchange labor cost while appreciably higher
hired labor one. This supports the idea that organic contract farming creates employment opportunities.
Unfortunately, not much can be say about the family labor input. The participation in the scheme decreases
the number of household members working oﬀ-farm but this ﬁnding is not statistically signiﬁcant. As a
whole, all these empirical ﬁndings  in particular the one given by the ﬁrst regression  go toward accepting
the Hypothesis I:
41This is a Generalized Method of Moments estimator (Mullahy, 1997) of Poisson regression given by the command ivpois-.
This is not an oﬃcial Stata command. See Nichols, Austin. 2007, ivpois: Stata module for IV/GMM Poisson regression:
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456890.html.
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After controlling for relevant determinants, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in farm labor
input between certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed farmers.
B. Channels through which Esco scheme increases labor demand
The previous part has brought support to the main hypothesis. Yet, this is interesting to detail how the
participation in the scheme aﬀects labor demand. In this part, I will focus on the sub-sample of certiﬁed
farmers in order to understand these channels42. Theoretically, three main changes associated with this
participation can impact the labor demand.
The ﬁrst possible eﬀect is due to the use of organic farming practices. These practices are also used by
non-certiﬁed farmers but certiﬁed farmers have received speciﬁc formation and advice about them. Thus they
are more likely to use them and maybe they do not process in the same way as non-certiﬁed farmers. The
common idea is that organic farming practice is labor intensive. In the whole sample, I have failed to ﬁnd
any support of this idea and on the contrary, organic practice seems have a negative eﬀect on the total labor
cost. Yet, this channel  in theory  is important and I will investigate further this point in the sub-sample
of certiﬁed farmers. The second possible eﬀect comes from economic incentive. By receiving a higher output
price, producers may have incentive to increase their production. From the simple farm-household model,
main intuition can be drawn. Higher output price may lead to a substitution eﬀect by increasing the leisure
consumption. Nevertheless this may also give incentive to increase output production, either by reallocating
more family labor into the farm or by using external labor as additional input. In fact, there is considerable
evidences in the literature that producers respond positively to price change by increasing the production
(and thus associated input use)43. Qualitative evidences on organic contract farming in Uganda go also
toward this conclusion (Gibbon et al. 2008, Bolwig et al. 2009). As a result, a priori, higher output price
should contribute to explain the increase in labor demand. However, this higher price received by scheme
member has two principal sources: a pure organic premium  coming from the organic certiﬁcation itself
 and a quality premium. Organic product has to satisfy high quality standards and this quality  even
without organic certiﬁcation  gives access to a higher price in the conventional market. The third possible
change that may explain the rise in labor demand is the upgrading of the quality. Besides giving access
to a better price, higher quality cocoa  with beans that have been fully or semi fermented and dried in
the sun  requires some production inputs. This requires time of course, but this may also increase labor
input. As a result, it may be interesting to see whether processing the cocoa beans signiﬁcantly impacts
labor demand. Nevertheless, there is here an important econometric challenge. How can we disentangle the
price incentive and the processing eﬀect? The Esco's price premium is only paid when the cocoa has
been processed. Therefore, higher quality beans may increase labor input either by higher labor requirement
(due to processing) or because of higher incentive (due to higher price). Econometrically this is obviously an
important issue. This is not possible to investigate into the same regression the price and the processing
eﬀect on a dependent variable, since these regressors are strongly linked and simultaneously determined. I
do not have  and I do not think it exists  instruments that can accurately correct for the resulting bias.
Besides, the correlation between them is too large (0.77 for this sub-sample), and this would lead to very
imprecise estimate.
As econometric approach, I have therefore decided to use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
method proposed by Zellner (1962). Two separate regression equations will be estimated. The ﬁrst one
will have `Price' and `Practice' as explanatory variables, plus usual control variables. The second one will
have `Process', `Practice' and similar control variables. The variable `Price' represents the logarithm of the
average cocoa price received by producers. `Practice' counts the number of organic practices among the four
more common practices (i.e. use of mulching, bio-pesticide, manure and soil conservation practices). `Process'
is the share of fully or semi-fermented organic cocoa on total cocoa production. The dependent variable will
be ﬁrst, the total labor cost and then, dummy variable indicating if household hires labor44. The interest
of this approach is simple. Since this is not possible to have 'Process' and 'Price' in the same regression,
42In the whole sample, estimate results lead to the same conclusion. Yet, coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance level are usually lower.
43See for instance Chhibber (1988), Askari and Cummings (1976) and Schiﬀ and Montenegro (1997)
44The dummy variable for the exchange labor does not have great interest for this empirical investigation since exchange labor
decreases with the participation in the scheme and is mainly socially determined. Besides the number of members working
oﬀ-farm can not be used to explain the channels through which the scheme impacts labor demand since the scheme does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect this variable.
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two independent equations are determined. Each of these equations is a correctly speciﬁed regression and
can be separately estimated. Assumptions done for the estimation method should be veriﬁed for each of this
regression. However, the error term of each of this equation is assumed to be correlated. Indeed this is greatly
possible that unobserved variables included in the error term of the ﬁrst equation are linked to the ones of
the second equation. Since in my case, these two equations are almost similar (only one regressor, 'Price'
or 'Process', change), most of what have been omitted in the ﬁrst equation would also have been omitted
in the second one. If errors terms are indeed correlated, a SUR regression will be more eﬃcient  at least
asymptotically - than completely independent estimates. Besides, as alternative approach I will estimate
independently these two regressions in order to be sure that assumption of correlated errors is not biasing
the result. Yet, for all the following regressions, reader has to keep in mind that coeﬃcients associated to the
explanatory variables 'Price' and 'Process' take into account two eﬀects: the economic incentive as well as
a potential higher labor requirement due to processing.
a. Labor cost
The dependent variable is the total labor cost that has been used in the previous part (A.a). Since this is
a continuous variable, an OLS estimation for the two equations seems adapted. Yet, tests are required to
ensure that underlying assumptions are veriﬁed. The general speciﬁcation test for the linear regression model
(Ramsey Reset test) is good, correlation between regressors is low and endogeneity should not signiﬁcantly
bias my result. However, contrary to the White test, the Breusch-Pagan (1979) Lagrange multiplier test
informs about the heteroskedasticity of the error terms. For the SUR regression, this is not a problem since
this approach uses by default a robust variance estimator45. However, for the alternative approach, robust
standard error will be used to correct this potential source of inference bias.
For the ﬁrst equation (including 'Practice' and 'Process' ): the coeﬃcient of 'Practice', of about -39.65,
has a negative sign but is not signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.121). On the contrary, 'Process' is strongly signiﬁcant
at a 0.1 percent level and has a large positive coeﬃcient of about 239.35. For the second equation (including
'Practice' and 'Price' ): 'Price' has a large positive coeﬃcient of about 285.24 that is signiﬁcant at 0.1
percent level. Coeﬃcients of other regressors are close to the ﬁrst equation and therefore this supports the
adequacy of the speciﬁcation. The simple OLS estimation with robust standard error provides exactly the
same coeﬃcient estimate and this conﬁrms these ﬁndings.
As a whole, we can conclude that higher price and higher beans quality cause a strong and signiﬁcant
increase in the external labor demand46. On the contrary, the practice of organic farming methods does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the external labor demand. The negative sign of the coeﬃcient associated to
'Practice' is counter-intuitive. Yet, given the very low adoption of organic practices, I do not think we should
put too much weight on this ﬁnding.
b. Use of hired labor
This second dependent variable indicates whether the household uses hired labor. Explanatory variables are
the same as previously and since the dependent is a dummy variable, I will use a probit regression with a SUR
approach. For the two probit regressions, the goodness-of-ﬁt test is good; there is no collinearity, endogeneity
and heteroskedastic issues47. As alternative approach, probit regressions will be separately estimated (i.e.
without assuming the correlation of the error terms as the SUR method does).
By using a SUR estimation, the coeﬃcient associated with 'Practice' is negative in both equation but
highly insigniﬁcant (p-value of 0.545 and 0.535). Besides, 'Process' aﬀects positively the fact that household
uses hired labor at a 5 percent level of signiﬁcance. 'Price' also aﬀects it positively and this is signiﬁcant
at a 1 percent level. Other regressors present similar coeﬃcients in the two regression and have expected
sign. Simple probit estimates also provide very similar results. While 'Practice' is still highly insigniﬁcant,
'Process' and 'Price' are both signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. These results are perfectly in line with the
previous result about total labor cost. If we assume that this dummy gives indication about the trend in the
45The SUR regression is given by the postestimation command -suest- (Stata 11).
46When the logarithm of the average cocoa price increases of 1 percent, the labor input cost increases of 81,364.2 USh per
year. When the share of fully- and semi- fermented cocoa increase of 1 percent, the labor input cost increases of 57,286.8 USh
per year.
47Hypothesis of homoskedastic errors is tested with the command -hetprob-.
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Table 4: Channels of the eﬀect of certiﬁcation on the total labor cost
SUR OLS 1 OLS 2
main
Practice -39.65 (-1.55) -39.65 (-1.49) -37.30 (-1.42)
Process 239.3∗∗∗ (3.37) 239.3∗∗ (3.24)
Hh_farmlab -29.89 (-0.80) -29.89 (-0.77) -21.30 (-0.56)
Hh_depend 21.37∗∗ (2.68) 21.37∗ (2.57) 22.12∗∗ (2.82)
Farm_size 183.2∗∗∗ (5.21) 183.2∗∗∗ (5.00) 177.9∗∗∗ (5.23)
Age -2.918∗ (-2.45) -2.918∗ (-2.35) -3.089∗ (-2.58)
Male -87.37 (-1.31) -87.37 (-1.26) -91.60 (-1.22)
Farmonly -111.9∗ (-2.06) -111.9+ (-1.98) -101.8+ (-1.80)
Revshare_othrcrop -2.567 (-1.38) -2.567 (-1.33) -1.271 (-0.79)
Price 285.2∗∗∗ (3.96)
_cons 142.4 (1.15) 142.4 (1.11) -1788.2∗∗ (-3.26)
one_lnvar
_cons 10.61∗∗∗ (84.97)
two_mean
Practice -37.30 (-1.48)
Price 285.2∗∗∗ (4.13)
Hh_farmlab -21.30 (-0.59)
Hh_depend 22.12∗∗ (2.94)
Farm_size 177.9∗∗∗ (5.44)
Age -3.089∗∗ (-2.69)
Male -91.60 (-1.27)
Farmonly -101.8+ (-1.87)
Revshare_othrcrop -1.271 (-0.82)
_cons -1788.2∗∗∗ (-3.39)
two_lnvar
_cons 10.54∗∗∗ (80.95)
N 117 117 117
t statistics in parentheses
Note: The dependent variable is 'CostLab'
Sources: Author's calculation, using Stata 11.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Channels of the eﬀect of certiﬁcation on the use of hired labor
SUR OLS 1 OLS 2
main
Practice -0.101 (-0.60) -0.101 (-0.64) -0.105 (-0.66)
Process 1.661∗ (2.11) 1.661∗ (1.99)
Hh_farmlab -0.430 (-1.60) -0.430 (-1.41) -0.416 (-1.35)
Hh_depend 0.115+ (1.78) 0.115 (1.51) 0.113 (1.48)
Farm_size 0.685∗∗ (2.85) 0.685∗∗ (2.74) 0.728∗∗ (2.96)
Age -0.0248∗∗ (-2.75) -0.0248∗ (-2.51) -0.0260∗∗ (-2.60)
Male -0.573 (-0.81) -0.573 (-0.86) -0.633 (-0.94)
Farmonly -0.252 (-0.68) -0.252 (-0.69) -0.189 (-0.52)
Revshare_othrcrop -0.0131 (-0.94) -0.0131 (-0.87) -0.00702 (-0.44)
Price 1.468∗ (2.52)
_cons 0.391 (0.32) 0.391 (0.32) -9.127∗ (-2.04)
probhire2_HireLab
Practice -0.105 (-0.62)
Price 1.468∗∗ (2.59)
Hh_farmlab -0.416 (-1.52)
Hh_depend 0.113+ (1.75)
Farm_size 0.728∗∗ (3.12)
Age -0.0260∗∗ (-2.91)
Male -0.633 (-0.84)
Farmonly -0.189 (-0.50)
Revshare_othrcrop -0.00702 (-0.53)
_cons -9.127∗ (-2.10)
N 117 117 117
t statistics in parentheses
Note: The dependent variable is 'HireLab'.
Sources: Author's calculation, using Stata 11.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
25
quantity of hired labor, then receiving higher price and producing higher quality cocoa lead to an increase in
the hired labor input.
As a result, this two dependent variables, 'CostLab' and 'HireLab', support the hypotheses 1-a. and 1-b.
while rejecting the hypothesis 1-c. After controlling for relevant determinants, this diﬀerence in farm labor
input is explained by the higher cocoa quality and/or the organic price premium oﬀered by Esco to certiﬁed
farmers. On the contrary, this diﬀerence in farm labor input is not signiﬁcantly explained by the use of
organic practices.
As a whole, this empirical investigation has supported that organic contract farming increases farm labor
demand. By controlling for selection bias, it has been rigorously shown that labor cost increases with the
participation in the Esco scheme. Besides, certiﬁed farmers are more engaged in the use of hired labor, while
less engaged in exchange labor system, than those of the control group. This may suggest that the rise in hired
labor input is appreciably stronger than the fall in exchange labor. If this true, organic contract farming
provides signiﬁcant employment opportunities for agricultural workers since the total cost has increased.
Nevertheless, this rise in labor demand is not signiﬁcantly due to the fact that organic practices are more
labor intensive  what data have failed to show  but is mainly explained by the higher quality of the
production and the organic price premium oﬀered by Esco.
8. Conclusion
The empirical investigation in the Esco organic contract farming scheme in western Uganda has shown that
external labor demand has increased for households participating in this scheme. Hence, this ﬁnding supports
the idea that organic contract farming can create employment opportunities. While this may be limiting in
region with scarce labor supply, this represents a positive and valuable spillover in a country like Uganda.
As a result, this study has provided the ﬁrst step in evaluating the impact of organic contract farming on
labor demand. Yet, further research should go on this way in order to quantify this eﬀect and provide a better
understanding of its channels. Indeed, while it is commonly assumed that organic practices increase labor
requirement, my empirical ﬁndings do not support such idea. In this study case, organic farming practices
do not have a signiﬁcant impact on labor demand. The determinants of this increase are mainly the higher
price due to organic certiﬁcation and/or from the up-grading of the cocoa quality. Yet, one study case is not
enough for drawing any deﬁnitive conclusion and this should be investigated further. Besides, general eﬀects
of organic contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa is still highly under-researched and a deeper evaluation is
required before promoting similar scheme on this continent.
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